Bava Kamma 82
היכא דבדק צור ושחט בו דעבדיה כעין סקילה אבל היכא דשחטיה בסכין לא
to refer to a case where the slaughterer prepared<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lit., 'tested', that is, to see whether it was fit for ritual slaughtering. ');"><sup>1</sup></span>
אמרי אטו סכין כתיבא באורייתא והתנן השוחט במגל יד בצור ובקנה שחיטתו כשירה
a piece of sharp flint and with it slaughtered the ox, which was thus dealt with as if it has been stoned, whereas where it had been slaughtered by means of a knife the prohibition should not apply? — To this it may be replied: Is a knife specifically mentioned in Scripture? Moreover we have learnt:<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Hul. 15b. ');"><sup>2</sup></span>
והשתא דנפקא ליה איסור אכילה ואיסור הנאה מלא יאכל את בשרו בעל השור נקי למה לי להנאת עורו דסלקא דעתך אמינא בשרו הוא דאסור בהנאה אבל עורו נשתרי בהנאה קמשמע לן בעל השור נקי
If one slaughters with a hand-sickle, with a flint or with a reed, the act of slaughtering has been properly executed.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Hul. 15b. ');"><sup>2</sup></span>
ולהנך תנאי דמפקי ליה להאי בעל השור נקי לדרשה אחרינא [כדבעינן למימר קמן] הנאת עורו מנא להו
And now that the prohibition in respect both of food and of any [other] use has been derived from [the text] <i>'his flesh shall not be eaten'</i>, what additional teaching is afforded to me by [the words] <i>'The owner of the ox shall be quit'</i>? — [The prohibition of] the use of the skin. For otherwise you might have been inclined to think that it was only the flesh that had been proscribed from being used, whereas the skin should be permitted to be used; we are therefore told [that this is not the case but] that <i>'the owner of the ox shall be quit</i>.' But what of those Tannaim who employ this [text], <i>'The owner of the ox shall be quit'</i> for deriving other implications (as we will indeed have to explain <i>infra</i>);<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. pp. 236-239. ');"><sup>3</sup></span>
נפקא להו מאת בשרו את הטפל לבשרו מאי ניהו עורו
whence do they derive the prohibition against the making use of the skin? — They derive it from [the auxiliary term in the Hebrew text] <i>'eth</i> his flesh', meaning, 'together with that which is joined to its flesh', that is, its skin. This Tanna,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Who needs the whole of the text to imply the prohibition of the skin. ');"><sup>4</sup></span>
כדתניא שמעון העמסוני ואמרי לה נחמיה העמסוני היה דורש כל אתין שבתורה כיון שהגיע (דברים ו, יג) לאת ה' אלהיך תירא פירש אמרו לו תלמידיו רבי כל אתין שדרשת מה תהא עליהן אמר להם כשם שקבלתי שכר על הדרישה כך קבלתי שכר על הפרישה
Simeon the Imsonite, or as others read, Nehemiah the Imsonite, used to expound [the term] <i>'eth'</i><span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' To imply some amplification of the statement actually made. ');"><sup>6</sup></span>
אמר לו ר' עקיבא והלא הוא עצמו אין משתלם אלא מגופו הביאהו לבית דין וישלם לך
His disciples said to him: Rabbi, what is to be done with all the expositions of [the term] <i>'eth'</i> which you have already given?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' To imply some amplification of the statement actually made. ');"><sup>6</sup></span>
אמר לו רבי אליעזר כך אני בעיניך שדיני בזה שחייב מיתה אין דיני אלא כשהמית את האדם על פי עד אחד או על פי בעלים
He said to them: Just as I have received reward for the [previous] expositions so have I received reward for the [present] abstention. When R. Akiba, however, came, he taught: '<i>Thou shalt fear</i> eth<i> the Lord thy God'</i> implies that the scholarly disciples are also to be feared.
על פי בעלים מודה בקנס הוא
Our Rabbis taught: <i>'But the owner of the ox shall be quit'</i> means, according to the view of R. Eliezer, quit from [paying] half <i>kofer</i>.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' In the case of Tam. ');"><sup>9</sup></span>
תניא אידך אמר לו רבי אליעזר עקיבא כך אני בעיניך שדיני בזה שחייב מיתה אין דיני אלא במתכוון להרוג את הבהמה והרג את האדם למצרי והרג ישראל לנפלים והרג בן קיימא
[why cannot the owner say to the plaintiff,] 'Bring it to the Court of Law and be reimbursed out of it'?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' But since the ox is put to death and the carcass including also the skin is proscribed for any use whatsoever, is it not evident that no payment could be made in the case of Tam killing a human being? Why then give a special indication to this effect? ');"><sup>11</sup></span>
הי אמר ליה ברישא רב כהנא משמיה דרבא אמר מתכוון אמר ליה ברישא רב טביומי משמיה דרבא אמר המית אמר ליה ברישא
R. Eliezer then said to him: 'Do I really appear so [simple] in your eyes that [you should take] my exposition to refer to a case of an ox liable [to be stoned] to death? My exposition referred only to one who killed the human being in the presence of one witness or in the presence of its owner.'<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' [In which case the ox is not stoned (v. Zeb. 71a: Rashi and Tosaf. s.v. [H]).] ');"><sup>12</sup></span>
רב כהנא משמיה דרבא אמר מתכוון אמר ליה ברישא משל לצייד ששולה דגים מן הים
In the presence of its owner! Would he not be admitting a penal liability?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For the payment of half-damages in the case of Tam is, as decided supra p. 67 of a penal character and as such liability for it could in any case not be established by the admission of the defendant, for which cf. supra p. 62 and infra p. 429. ');"><sup>13</sup></span> — R. Eliezer maintains that <i>kofer</i> partakes of a propitiatory character.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' And liability to it would thus have been established even by the admission of the defendant. ');"><sup>14</sup></span> Another [Baraitha] teaches: R. Eliezer said to him: Akiba, do I really appear so [simple] in your eyes that [you take] my exposition to refer to an ox liable [to be stoned] to death? My exposition referred only to one who had been intending to kill a beast but [by accident] killed a man, [or where it had been intending to kill] an Egyptian and killed an Israelite, [or] a non-viable child and killed a viable child.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. supra p. 232. n. 11. ');"><sup>15</sup></span> Which of the answers, was given first? — R. Kahana in the name of Raba said that [the answer about] intention was given first, whereas R. Tabyomi in the name of Raba said that [the answer about] having killed [the man in the presence of one witness etc.] was given first. R. Kahana, who in the name of Raba said [that the answer about] intention was given first, compared him to a fisherman who had been catching fishes in the sea;